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Abstract: Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we per-
sist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that 
we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists ar-
gue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same 
intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are ‘too 
many thinkers’ associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans 
have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically 
different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, 
the idea of a person being numerically distinct but coincident with 
an animal is rejected and animalists conclude that we simply are 
animals. However, animalists face a similar problem when confronted 
with the vagueness of composition. Animals are entities with vague 
boundaries. According to the linguistic account of vagueness, the 
vagueness of a term consists in there being a number of candidates 
for the denotatum of the vague term. It seems to imply that where 
we see an animal, there are, in fact, a lot of distinct but overlapping 
entities with basically the same intrinsic properties, including think-
ing. As a result, the animalist must also posit ‘too many thinkers’ 
where we thought there was only one. This seems to imply that the 
animalist cannot accept the linguistic account of vagueness. In this 
paper the author argues that the animalist can accept the linguistic 
account of vagueness and retain her argument against Lockeanism. 
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1. Introduction 
 Animalism is a theory of personal identity according to which you and 
I are animals. A further claim that both some animalists and their oppo-
nents make is that animals persist by virtue of biological continuity.1 For 
an animal to exist, there has to be a life, and for an animal to continue 
existing, there has to be a continuing life (Olson 2007, 29; van Inwagen 
1990, 145; DeGrazia 2005, 51–56). 
 There are other popular accounts of how we persist. Historically, the 
most influential have been psychological theories inspired by Locke, accord-
ing to which we are not animals, but persons—essentially intelligent beings 
with sophisticated mental capacities, which persist by virtue of psychologi-
cal continuity. 
 At first glance, there does not seem to be a disagreement between these 
two accounts.2 After all, could intelligent beings with sophisticated mental 
capacities not be animals? And could animals not be intelligent and have 
sophisticated mental capacities? In other words, could a particular animal 
                                                 
1  Not all animalists accept this claim. See, for instance, Snowdon (2014) for a the-
ory according to which the criterion of personal persistence is the retention of the 
life-apt structure, or McDowell (1997) who defends the claim that psychological con-
tinuity is the criterion of persistence of animals. Also, as Olson (2015) points out, 
this claim is quite independent of the first claim. Olson coins the conjunction of the 
two claims strong animalism and concedes that it is strong animalism that usually 
stirs up debate. In what follows, when I refer to animalism, I always mean the con-
junction of the two claims.  
2  But, as Olson (2015) points out, the two accounts respond to very different 
questions. Animalism is a response to the question of what we are. Lockeanism res-
ponds to the question of how we persist. Neither answer has any direct implications 
for the other question. Olson also shows that the implications of Lockeanism for the 
‘What are we?’ question are quite unclear. In this paper I accept the minimum that 
is usually accepted: persons are material entities with complex psychological proper-
ties, such as self-reflection, and, importantly, they are not animals.  
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and a particular person not be one and the same thing? According to the 
Lockeans, they could not, because animals and persons differ in their essen-
tial properties and in what they can survive. While the persistence condi-
tions of animals are biological, ours are psychological. This means that we 
persist as long as there is psychological continuity—an uninterrupted chain 
of mental states.3 If the chain is interrupted, we cease to exist, even though 
a living animal may continue to exist (Shoemaker 1984; Lewis 1976).  
 The claim that the lives of persons and animals may come apart is usually 
supported by thought experiments involving brain state transfer devices, tel-
eporters, brain transplants, etc., or real-life examples of humans in a coma or 
a permanent vegetative state [see (Parfit 1984, 197–200), for instance].  
 There are a number of different psychological theories, but the most 
widely held ones claim that persons are material entities which are not 
animals, but are related to animals by a very intimate relation. In some 
versions this relation is material coincidence—the sharing of matter (Shoe-
maker 1984, 113). In others it is the relation of constitution (Baker 2000; 
Johnston 1987, 2007), though this also entails material coincidence (Baker 
2000, 43). Just as a statue is constituted by a lump of clay but is not iden-
tical to it, because the lump can persist through changes that the statue 
cannot, a person is (it is claimed) constituted by an animal but, for similar 
reasons, not identical to it. 
 Psychological theories of this sort must explain two mysteries.  
 Mystery 1 
 If persons are material entities, if each person is made of the same matter 
as an animal and if persons are not identical to animals, then where I am 
right now, there are two material entities—a person and an animal—that 
share every particle of matter and their overall structure. As a result, it 
                                                 
3  For instance, Parfit defines psychological continuity as the overlapping chains of 
strong psychological connectedness. Psychological connectedness is the holding of 
direct psychological connections, such as the connections between memories and the 
experiences that caused the memories, intentions and experiences of actions resulting 
from the intentions, etc. Connectedness is strong if ‘the number of connections, over 
any day, is at least half the number of direct connections that hold, over every day, 
in the lives of nearly every actual person’ (Parfit 1984, 205). 
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seems impossible to explain plausibly how these two entities could differ in 
the way that the Lockeans claim.  
 First, each such animal must be a person. Each such animal has a brain 
just like the person, the brain is functioning and, if consciousness and 
thought are generated by the functioning of the brain, each such animal is 
conscious and thinks. In fact, each such animal has mental capacities as 
complex as the coincident person. That seems to qualify it as a person, too 
(Olson 1997, 100). So if I am not an animal, as the Lockeans claim (that is, 
if I am a person and persons are not animals), there must be two conscious 
and thinking beings where we normally thought there was only one—me 
and the animal—which makes the Lockean theory inconsistent, because 
then there are two persons, only one of whom persists by virtue of psycho-
logical continuity (Olson 1997, 106–109).4 
 Second, each such person must be an animal. Being a material entity 
coincident with an animal, it must be composed of particles that together 
give rise to a life; it has a heart, lungs, metabolism, immune system, etc. In 
fact, it has all the characteristics that make the animal an animal. That 
seems to qualify it as an animal, too.  
 If an entity’s intrinsic properties depend on its microphysical structure, 
it seems obvious that animals and persons must have the same intrinsic 
properties. That makes it a complete mystery how one can have biological 
persistence conditions while the other has psychological ones. How could 
something make one cease to exist while not affecting the other (Olson 1997, 
98)? Call this the metaphysical mystery.5 
 Mystery 2 
 Suppose we can explain Mystery 1, and where I am there are two mate-
rial entities that are indistinguishable in terms of their intrinsic properties. 
Which one of them am I? The question would not be worth answering if 
the alternative answers had no practical implications. But if I am an animal, 
I will still exist when in a permanent vegetative state (PVS), whereas if 
                                                 
4  This problem is often referred to as ‘the thinking animal problem’ or ‘the too 
many thinkers problem’. 
5  This is a special instance of the general problem of metaphysical grounding. See, 
for instance, (deRosset 2011). 
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I am a person, I will not—no person can be identical to any being in PVS, 
because beings in PVS are not persons and all persons are persons essen-
tially. Further, if I am a person, it may be rational for me to have my head 
removed at the moment of my death and preserved by Alcor in the hope of 
it being transplanted onto a new body one day—psychological continuity 
with the person in the new body will ensure it is me. If I am an animal, this 
would be an unjustifiable waste of resources, because the animal I am does 
not get transferred to the new body.6 But how am I to find out? I may 
think that I am the person, but the animal thinks the same. One of us is 
mistaken, though, and there is no way we can find out (Olson 1997, 106). 
Call this the epistemic mystery.  
 These two mysteries lead to the following argument against Lockeanism 
and in favour of animalism: if a particular animal and a particular person 
completely overlap and share every particle of matter, then they must be 
indistinguishable in their intrinsic properties. But if they are indistin-
guishable with respect to every intrinsic property and if we plausibly sup-
pose that persistence conditions are grounded in intrinsic properties, then 
they cannot differ in their persistence conditions. But then what grounds 
do we have for claiming that the person is not the animal? If the person 
shares every intrinsic property with the animal and begins and ceases to 
exist at the same time as the animal, why suppose it is numerically dis-
tinct from the animal? The animal must be as conscious as the person is, 
the person must have a heart and breathe as much as the animal, and 
surely it would be absurd to suppose that all of these properties are du-
plicated where the animal and the person coincide. And even if they were 
duplicated, it would still be hard to explain the alleged difference in persis-
tence conditions. Thus, the Lockean claim that persons are not animals 
seems hard to justify. The animalist concludes that where I am, there are 
not two entities that are both living, conscious, thinking and meet the 
criteria for personhood. There is just one—the animal. This conclusion 
seems to be in accordance with both common sense and the findings of the 
natural sciences.  
                                                 
6  This claim is not accepted by all animalists. Van Inwagen (1990, 170) argues 
that head transplants preserve biological continuity and, thus, move the animal to 
the new body. 
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2. The vagueness of composition 
 However, the reasoning that the animalist uses to undermine psycholog-
ical theories seems to lose its footing when we attempt to make sense of the 
phenomenon of vagueness of composition.  
 When examined closely, the human organism, or any organism for that 
matter, resembles a cloud. (Animalists sometimes actually liken a life, the 
concept they use to define organisms, to a storm.) In a cloud, the sharp 
boundaries that we observe from a distance become blurry once we inspect 
it closely. The further we go from the core of the cloud, the more frequently 
we will find water droplets that are less and less integrated into the body 
of the cloud, until we find droplets of which it is impossible to say whether 
they are parts of the cloud or not.  
 Organisms are very similar. There are particles that are deeply incorpo-
rated into their metabolic system, particles that are clearly not and particles 
that are in various stages of incorporation, making it impossible to deter-
mine whether they are parts of the organism or not. These may include, for 
instance, particles in molecules of food that are being absorbed into the 
blood stream or particles in dying skin cells. As a result of this indetermi-
nacy of parthood, it is impossible to determine precisely where the bound-
aries of an organism lie.  
 The vagueness of composition affects virtually all material objects we 
encounter every day. But why is it supposed to be a problem, and why 
should animalists be especially concerned about it?7 There is a famous ar-
gument, formulated independently by Peter Unger (1980) and Peter Geach 
(1980), which shows that if we accept the existence of vague boundaries of 
objects, we are driven to the conclusion that where there seems to be a sin-
gle object, there are actually a great number of them—something that flies 
                                                 
7  It is not just animalists who should be concerned about vagueness. Adherents to 
the bodily view, the brain view and even those Lockeans who believe that persons 
are material entities (see below) should have an account of vagueness. But it has 
been animalists who have built their opposition to Lockeanism around the idea that 
positing two numerically distinct but completely overlapping entities leads to 
a number of problems. Anyone who says that should be especially concerned about 
vagueness, as I show below.  
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in the face of common sense and seems to undermine the animalist’s belief 
that where I am, there is just one material entity that is conscious, intelli-
gent and thinking.  
 The argument was termed the Problem of the Many by Unger. I will 
now present a version tailored to my purposes. 
1. Suppose there is a human organism with vague boundaries. Call it O.  
2. Then there are particles D1–Dn, which are determinately parts of O, 
and particles I1–In, which are indeterminately parts of O.  
3. Then there are various sets of particles S1–Sn, which are equally suit-
ably arranged to compose8 an organism. For instance, S1 = {D1–Dn}, 
S2 = {D1–Dn, I1}, S3 = {D1–Dn, I2}, etc. 
4. For each set S, the members of S compose an entity. (It would be 
unjustified to claim that the members of S1, for instance, compose 
something, while the members of S2, differing only by a single parti-
cle, do not compose anything. The difference of a single particle 
seems to be compositionally negligible.) 
5. If O exists, then each of these entities is an organism. (It would be 
unjustified to claim that the members of S1 compose an entity which 
is an organism, while the members of S2, differing only by a single 
particle, compose an entity which is not an organism. An organism 
cannot differ from a non-organism by a single particle only.) 
6. Then for each organism O, there are a great number of organisms 
which almost completely overlap O. (Some differ by a single particle, 
others by more particles, but still negligibly.)  
 The reason animalists should be concerned about this argument should 
now be obvious. In their challenge to Lockeanism, animalists show the trou-
blesome implications of Lockeans postulating materially coincident but nu-
merically distinct entities—if a person and an animal coincide, they must 
share all of their intrinsic properties, they must both think, be intelligent, and 
                                                 
8  Simply put, composition is a relation among objects such that if the objects O1–
On stand in that relation, there is an object P that has objects O1–On as parts.  
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be persons. As a result, there are more persons and thinkers than we thought 
there were. Moreover, only some persist by virtue of psychological continuity. 
However, if animals are vague objects, the animalist will have to face prob-
lems of a very similar type. All the different sets contain particles that have, 
as far as we can tell, an equal claim to compose an animal, and since they 
differ so minutely, they will all presumably have virtually the same intrinsic 
properties. Specifically, if I am conscious, they will almost certainly be con-
scious, if I am thinking and intelligent, they will almost certainly be thinking 
and intelligent, and if I am a person, they will almost certainly be persons.  
 It seems that the animalist is driven to a difficulty quite similar to the 
one he ascribes to the Lockean. If he has to accept a multiplicity of animals 
in virtually the same place, why could there not be two material entities—
an animal and a person—in the very same place? Surely, a few particles 
cannot make that much difference. 
3. Solutions to the Problem of the Many 
 Metaphysical theories offer a number of solutions to the Problem of the 
Many. Peter Unger originally suggested a solution that has become known 
as nihilism. It is based on the idea that it is absurd to conclude that all of 
the sets S1–Sn contain particles that compose something, and thus denies 
premise 4. But the only alternative is that none of the sets compose any-
thing. And if none of them compose anything, there aren’t any vague ob-
jects. That would not be so troubling if vagueness did not affect all of the 
objects that we encounter in the world. Since it does, where we thought 
there were vague objects, there turn out to be only particles that compose 
nothing. As a result, none of the ordinary things we think there are actually 
exist (Unger 1980, 462). 
 This solution is radical and certainly not in tune with what the animalist 
wants to say. Animalism holds that there is at least one sort of composite 
object—animals. (Whether there are chairs, clouds or rusty nails is a matter 
the animalist qua animalist does not attempt to answer.) Nihilism offers too 
few entities to the animalist. 
 There are, however, solutions to the problem that the animalist can 
accept. One solution favoured by two prominent animalists appeals to 
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ontic vagueness (van Inwagen 1990, 213–227; Olson 2008, 42). This solu-
tion claims that the many organisms are a single organism with vague 
boundaries. Arguably, the animalist can also accept the brutalist response 
as defended by Markosian (1998), according to which there is no interest-
ing answer to the question of when composition occurs and compositional 
facts are brute facts. On this account, particles in only one of the sets 
compose an organism, but there is no interesting explanation as to why 
the particles in the other sets do not compose anything. But I want to 
look more closely at solutions that do not seem to be available to the 
animalist because they posit far more entities than the animalist is willing 
to accept. These solutions are, respectively, the semantic account of 
vagueness (semanticism) based on the notion of supervaluations, and a so-
lution by means of partial identity as defended by David Lewis. At first 
sight, the animalist cannot treat the vagueness of animals as a matter of 
semantic indecision, because that solution requires there to be many 
equally suitable candidates in nearly the same place at the same time. 
Lewis’ analysis of vagueness of composition also entails the existence of 
a multiplicity of candidates. If correct, these views would seem to be in-
consistent with there being just one animal in the space where I am lo-
cated.9 
 However, both of these solutions are based on the idea that although 
the multiplicity is real, we can (in a manner of speaking) “cheat” and pre-
tend that there is just one entity in the place where we want it. The key 
question is whether the animalist can cheat too.  
4. Cheating I 
 The semantic solution to the Problem of the Many is based on rejecting 
premise 5 of the argument. According to that premise, the objects composed 
by the many sets of particles are all organisms. Semanticism denies this—
the sets of particles do compose entities, but these entities are mere candi-
dates for being an organism, and only one candidate is an organism [see e.g. 
                                                 
9  See, for instance, (Zimmerman 2008, 30). 
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(Lewis 1999, 171);10 see also (McGee and McLaughlin 2000); (McKinnon 
2002)]. Let us look at the details.  
 Semanticism is a theory according to which vagueness is essentially 
a linguistic matter resulting from the fact that our expressions do not 
have precisely specified denotata. According to semanticism, the world is 
perfectly discrete, containing only entities with sharp boundaries, but our 
expressions are sometimes indeterminate regarding which of the sharp ob-
jects they actually denote. Thus, the expression “tall person” is vague, 
because it could denote the set of people who are at least 180 cm tall or 
the set of people who are at least 190 cm tall, and we have never needed 
to determine the denotatum precisely. The vagueness of a term is  
thus explained by postulating a number of candidate denotata that are 
precise (so-called “precisifications”) and saying that it has not been de-
termined which of the precise candidates is the actual denotatum of the 
vague term.  
 But sometimes we could, if we wished to, make a vague term precise by 
selecting out of the many alternative precisifications the one that will from 
now on be the denotatum. Sometimes we do just that. For instance, we 
need to precisify the term “the moment of death” for legal and medical 
purposes. On other occasions it would be entirely pointless to do so, because 
what we want to say using the vague term will be true regardless of which 
of the precisifications is the actual denotatum of the vague term.  
 But the general assumption of the semantic account is that there are 
many precisifications for a vague term, each of which is a suitable candidate 
to be the denotatum of the term. The multiplicity of the candidates seems 
to be inconsistent with the above argument for animalism and against 
Lockeanism. Suppose there are a number of candidates to be the organism 
that I am. Although the candidates do not completely coincide, they over-
lap so extensively that a great number of them will very likely share many 
intrinsic properties. Specifically, if I am conscious, many others will be. If 
I am thinking, many others will be thinking as well. As a result, there 
would seem to be too many thinkers where we thought there was only 
                                                 
10  Lewis endorses both views to be discussed here—semanticism as well as partial 
identity. See (Lewis 1999, 179–82). 
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one—something the animalist certainly does not want to admit in the light 
of her argument against Lockeanism.  
 However, it can be argued that the animalist can accept the semanticist 
framework if it is enriched by a method known as supervaluation, which 
assigns truth values to statements containing vague terms [see (Lewis 1999, 
171–75)]. In this method, each sentence containing a vague term is broken 
down into many different interpretations in which the vague term is re-
placed by one of the precisifications, and the statement is then evaluated. 
Statements which come out true on every precisification are supertrue. 
Statements which come out false on every precisification are superfalse. And 
statements which come out true on some precisifications and false on others 
are supertruth-valueless. The important lesson is that according to this ver-
sion of semanticism, the goal of communication is to convey not truth, but 
supertruth.  
 Accepting the supervaluationist framework gives us the resources to 
solve the Problem of the Many in a manner consistent with animalism. 
More specifically, we can show that it is entirely legitimate to say that 
where I am, there is just one organism.  
 To see that, let us focus on a particular organism; call it R. Suppose, 
then, that there are various precisifications of R. Let us assume for simplic-
ity that there are just four: 
P1: R is composed of the set of particles S1 = {o, p, q, r}; 
P2: R is composed of the set of particles S2 = {o, p, q, s}; 
P3: R is composed of the set of particles S3 = {o, p, r, s}; 
P4: R is composed of the set of particles S4 = {o, q, r, s}. 
Suppose that R is now sitting in the living room and watching TV, and 
consider the sentence “R is watching TV”. 
 The supervaluation of this sentence will assign truth values to all of the 
precisifications of the sentence which result from replacing R with a pre-
cisely defined term. For brevity, let us assume that “R(P1)” means “R un-
der the precisification P1”.  
 The following will now hold: 
“R(P1) is watching TV” is true.  
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“R(P2) is watching TV” is true.  
“R(P3) is watching TV” is true.  
“R(P4) is watching TV” is true.  
Since the sentence “R is watching TV” is true on all precisifications, it is 
supertrue, and we are entitled to assert it.  
 By contrast, let us now consider the sentence “R is composed of {o, p, 
q, r}”. This sentence will be true if R = R(P1), but it will be false on all 
other precisifications. This discrepancy in truth values results in the sen-
tence being supertruth-valueless. The same goes for “R is composed of {o, 
p, q, s}”, etc. Since R is a vague term, we cannot claim that its denotatum 
is determinately composed of a particular set of particles. Any such claim 
will lack supertruth value.  
 But now consider the sentence “Only one set of particles composes R”. 
What will be the supertruth value of this sentence? The above examples 
suggest that on each precisification only one set of particles composes R. 
On R(P1) it is S1 and no other set, on R(P2) it is S2 and no other set, etc. 
Since it is true on every precisification, the sentence “Only one set of par-
ticles composes R” is supertrue and we are justified in asserting it.  
 The above considerations entail the following claims: R is a vague term. 
There are many alternative precisifications of R. It is impossible to say 
which precisification is the sole legitimate denotatum of R, for none are. 
However, on any precisification there will be just one R. That means that 
where I am, there is just one organism, even though it cannot be determi-
nately stated which of the alternative precisifications it is.  
 Since, according to supervaluationism, the goal of communication is to 
convey information that is supertrue, and since the sentence “Where I am, 
there is just one organism” will be supertrue on the supervaluationist ac-
count, the animalist is perfectly justified in asserting it. 
5. Cheating II 
 The semantic solution to the Problem of the Many is based on rejecting 
the claim that all of the entities composed by the different sets are organisms. 
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Another solution to the Problem of the Many is offered by David Lewis 
(Lewis 1999, 177–79). Lewis introduces the concept of partial identity to 
show that although the entities are all organisms, we can still (in a manner 
of speaking) say that there is just one organism. Because this solution ac-
cepts the multiplicity of organisms, it too should be unavailable to the an-
imalist. I will show, however, that this is not necessarily the case.  
 Let us consider again the entities composed by members of S1–Sn. In the 
context of the Lewisian theory, we can admit they are all organisms and 
call them O1–On. If we interpret the concepts of identity and non-identity 
in the standard, strict way, O1–On will all be different from each other. 
Strict identity is reserved for the relation of an object to itself. Any objects 
that do not completely overlap are non-identical. And since none of O1–On 
completely overlap, they are non-identical, that is, different. Lewis, how-
ever, suggests a different interpretation, one that is more in tune with com-
mon sense and ordinary language. He accepts that the concept of strict 
identity applies to objects that completely overlap, but reserves the con-
cept of strict non-identity for cases of objects which do not overlap at all, 
such as my computer and the Eiffel Tower. But in between these two 
extremes, there is a spectrum of objects that overlap to different degrees, 
thus falling under the concept of partial identity. At one end there are 
cases like that of Siamese twins connected only by a finger, and at the 
other there are objects that share almost every part, such as our organisms 
O1–On. According to Lewis, objects in this spectrum are partially identical, 
and objects with very extensive overlap are almost identical (Lewis 1999, 
178).  
 Just as the ordinary notion of identity differs from the concept of strict 
identity, so does the concept of counting. Strictly speaking, we count ac-
cording to identity interpreted the standard way. If we do so, the sentence 
“Where I am, there is just one organism” will be false, because it is not true 
that O1–On completely overlap. But in ordinary circumstances, says Lewis, 
we sometimes count according to relations other than identity (Lewis 1999, 
175), and there is no reason why we could not use the concept of partial 
identity for counting, especially in cases where there is very extensive over-
lap. In such cases we can say the objects are almost identical. As a result, 
the above sentence will be almost true and by a blameless approximation 
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we may say that where I am, there is just one organism. For most contexts, 
this will be true enough, according to Lewis.  
6. The cheating revealed 
 Both the supervaluationist solution and the solution by partial identity 
enable the animalist to retain the premise of his argument against the psy-
chological theory of personal identity: where I am, there is just one organ-
ism (one person, one thinker, etc.). On the supervaluationist solution, alt-
hough the term “organism R” is vague and there are a number of precisifi-
cations that could be suitable as the denotatum of the term, on any such 
precisification it will be true that exactly one set contains all and only those 
particles that compose R. This gives the status of supertruth to the animal-
ist premise. Using partial identity, the animalist may say that although 
strictly speaking there are many organisms where I am, since they overlap 
to such a great extent we may say they are almost identical, which is good 
enough for most contexts.  
 However, I have already indicated that these two solutions amount to 
a sort of cheating. Opponents will be quick to point out that the real issue 
is not what we may permissibly say on most occasions, but what is actually 
the case. And no matter what we say on these accounts, we still have to 
face the facts. 
 The supervaluationist solution fails, its opponents might say, because it 
merely carefully conceals the fact that the precisifications are all material 
entities, that they are all extremely similar, and that, as a result, they are 
all equally well suited to be the organism. The fact that we can speak as if 
there were just one organism, because nothing turns on which of these en-
tities we pick as the denotatum of the term, cannot hide the simple fact 
that all these very similar entities exist and that we cannot provide a plau-
sible selection principle for choosing between them. As a result, we must 
accept the fact that where I am, there are millions of other thinking and 
intelligent organisms, and I cannot point to a single feature that makes one 
rather than any other one me.  
 Similarly, the solution based on partial identity can easily be discredited, 
because it is simply a form of pretence. Certainly, we can pretend that there 
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is just one organism where I am, because all of the organisms that exist 
there are so extremely similar that we can hardly tell them apart. But this 
is just a façon de parler. There are all sorts of ways of speaking, but when 
hard-pressed we would have to admit that even though the organisms are 
almost identical, they are not in fact identical.  
7. Facing the facts 
 Suppose, then, that we admit that we have been cheating, and we face 
the facts. There are two questions that need to be answered. 1) Do the facts 
pose any special problems for the animalist as opposed to any reasonable 
person? 2) Does the admission enable the Lockean to score any points over 
the animalist? To both of these questions, my answer is no.  
 Regarding the first problem, we need to remember that the animalist 
takes the claim “Where I am, there is just one organism” to be a pretheo-
retical belief, an intuition, that most reasonable people normally accept. It 
is in all our interests to find a solution to the Problem of the Many, because 
it challenges this very intuition. The two suggested solutions attempt to 
save the intuition by saying, in their own ways, that in spite of the actual 
plurality, the intuition is still, in a sense, correct. If the solutions are deemed 
unacceptable, then we are all in trouble, for we are all deeply mistaken 
about how many objects there are. But the animalist, who says that where 
I am there is just one organism, is not in any deeper trouble than the cab-
inetmaker who says that she is working on a chest of drawers or the 
zookeeper who says that she is feeding an elephant. We all want there to 
be exactly as many things as we believe there are, and the supposition that 
there are a lot more than we think is disturbing to all of us. To put it 
another way, the animalist has the same beliefs about the number of ani-
mals in the world as ordinary people do. And whatever explication of those 
beliefs we must accept in order to account for vagueness, the animalist will 
be happy to accept, too.  
 But does the admission of plurality of organisms not give the Lockean 
the right to accept her preferred picture of personal identity? Does it not 
allow her to claim that where I am, there are two entities, an animal and 
a person? Could the Lockean not reason as follows? 
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If the animalist can accept that where there seems to be one organism, 
there are, in fact, a great number of them, differing only by a single 
particle, then the Lockean can accept that where I am, there are two 
material entities, which do not differ by a single particle. After all, one 
particle surely cannot make any difference.  
 Well, it seems that she cannot, because there is a substantial difference 
between the plurality that the animalist accepts and the plurality that the 
Lockean defends. Remember that one premise of the Problem of the Many 
is that all of these alternative objects are so extremely similar that it would 
be completely unjustified to say one is an organism while the other is not. 
So they are all organisms. And whatever we normally wish to say about one 
of them will be true about all of the others. In particular, if one thinks, they 
all think, and if one has biological persistence conditions, they all do. This 
is what justifies us cheating, if anything does, and saying there is just one 
organism, one thinker, one biological continuer, etc.  
 The Lockean, in contrast, does not want to say that the animal and the 
person that it shares matter with are such that whatever one says about 
one of them will also be true of the other, despite the fact that they com-
pletely overlap. Some Lockeans say that the animal does not think (Shoe-
maker 1999), others claim it thinks only derivatively (Baker 2008), but all 
Lockeans say that the person cannot permanently cease to be conscious, 
whereas the animal can. So even if we tolerate cheating on the part of the 
animalist, we still have no justification for tolerating the idea that there can 
be two completely overlapping numerically distinct objects with different 
persistence conditions. No solution to the Problem of the Many that is 
available to the animalist licenses this Lockean claim. 
 Let’s look at the dialectic of the dispute from the perspective of the 
two mysteries stated above. The animalist claims that the Lockean has to 
explain the metaphysical and the epistemic mystery. These mysteries 
arise, it will be remembered, because the Lockean claims that where I am, 
there are two material entities which completely overlap. Confronted with 
the vagueness of organisms, the animalist admits that where I am, there 
are multiple organisms which overlap not completely, but almost com-
pletely. Could the Lockean now say that the animalist has to explain the 
two mysteries, too?  
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 I don’t think so. The metaphysical mystery is a mystery about how two 
completely overlapping entities might differ in their persistence conditions. 
But the almost completely overlapping organisms do not differ in their per-
sistence conditions! After all, they are all organisms, and they can all sur-
vive whatever an organism can survive. In particular, they can all survive 
the permanent loss of consciousness. The metaphysical problem is only 
a problem for the Lockean, because she claims that one of the overlapping 
entities cannot survive what the other can.  
 What about the epistemic mystery? Does the animalist not have to ex-
plain which of the almost completely overlapping organisms I am? Here the 
answer is trickier. Notice, however, that the epistemic question is troubling 
only if the answer has practical consequences. In the Lockean framework, 
the consequences are important. I need to know whether I am the animal 
or the person, because the answer entails what I can survive and whether 
it would be rational for me to visit Alcor, for instance. But in the case of 
the multiplicity of organisms the answer will have no practical implications, 
as we have seen. All of the organisms can pretty much survive the same 
things and get killed by the same things. So even if where I am there are 
millions of other organisms and I cannot tell which of them I really am, 
I am still confident that I cannot teleport myself and that developing an 
autoimmune disease may kill me even if Alcor intervenes at the last minute.  
So it is a mystery which of these multiple organisms I am, but it is one that 
is much easier to live (and die) with.11 And let’s not forget that this is 
a mystery that most of us have to solve, as we share the animalist intuition 
about the number of organisms.  
 Not everyone will be persuaded by this argument. It may be pointed out 
that I have ignored the real challenge that the problem of the many poses 
to the animalist and, instead, shifted attention to its practical implications. 
                                                 
11  An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that the epistemic mystery dissolves on 
the semantic theory of vagueness, because the term ‘I’ will be vague in much the 
same way that the term ‘organism’ is. Thus, there is no answer to the question of 
which precise object I am, because ‘I’ does not refer determinately to any of them. 
I appreciate this comment. 
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But the problem is inherently metaphysical and epistemic, and it is in this 
light that it must be addressed.12  
 Two things can be said in response. First, it may be said that there is 
some value in purely metaphysical and epistemic arguments, but if nothing 
in practice turns on these arguments, the value is relatively low. Applying 
this line of reasoning, which is deeply rooted in the American Pragmatist 
tradition, we may say that the Lockean position is not disquieting merely 
because it prevents us from truly knowing whether we are persons or ani-
mals, but primarily because such knowledge is necessary for many of our 
practical interactions. The problem of vagueness of composition that the 
animalist must face, however, is merely theoretical. Perhaps it is a genuine 
epistemic issue that I am not able to tell which of the equally well-suited 
aggregates of matter I am. But nothing else hangs on it. Whether or not 
I am this or that aggregate of particles, I will be able to do the same things, 
survive the same changes and have the same mental capacities.  
 Secondly, the underlying assumption of the presented defence of animal-
ism is the same as that which underlies the whole project of linguistic solu-
tions to vagueness in general. These solutions also emphasize the practical 
aspects of the issue. The sceptic might object: ‘Look, perhaps we can talk 
as if there were just one cloud in the sky, but the real issue is a metaphysical 
one, not linguistic—there are many of them and we have no reason for 
preferring one of them. So, we cannot refer to ‘the cloud’ and make any 
statements about it due to referential failure.’ But the whole supervalua-
tionist project is based on the idea that the practical issues trump the met-
aphysical ones. We do succeed in referring to the cloud and saying true 
things about it in spite of the fact that, metaphysically speaking, there are 
other equally good candidates. The important thing is that since most of 
what we say will be true regardless of which candidate is the right one, it 
might hurt that we cannot solve the metaphysical problem, but not very 
much. 
 This brings me to a final point related to the dialectic of the dispute. It 
has been noted that vagueness affects all composite material objects. The 
Lockean also believes in such objects. In fact, she believes in more composite 
                                                 
12  I would like to thank another anonymous reviewer for this objection.  
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material objects than the animalist, for in her ontology there are persons in 
addition to animals, and both of these are material and composite. And if 
animals face the Problem of the Many, surely persons do as well. As a re-
sult, the Lockean is bound to believe that where I am, there are millions of 
almost completely overlapping organisms and millions of almost completely 
overlapping persons, each of which completely overlaps with one of the or-
ganisms, but is not identical to it and differs from it in persistence condi-
tions. The Lockean seems to have a lot more to explain than the animalist. 
It is not that the Lockean cannot employ supervaluationism or partial iden-
tity to account for the vagueness of persons or animals. She surely can. But 
that is not the main problem the Lockean is facing. The main problem is 
how to account for their relationship: how to simultaneously maintain that 
persons are material entities that coincide with animals and that persons 
and animals are numerically distinct and have different persistence condi-
tions; how to maintain that the animal is distinct from the person when it 
apparently has the mental properties sufficient for personhood. These are 
not problems induced by vagueness, so the solutions to the problem of 
vagueness are of no use there. 
8. Conclusion 
 There are currently no generally accepted solutions to the Problem of 
the Many. Each solution has implications that clash with some of our intu-
itions. Solutions based on ontic vagueness or on brutal composition entail 
or are at least consistent with the idea that where I am, there is literally 
one material object. The solutions I have defended in this paper take a less 
direct approach, but still enable the animalist at least to say that there is 
one material object. All of these strategies are respectable, even if they have 
their critics. My goal has been to show that (a) the animalist is free to 
adopt the linguistic solutions to the problem, (b) this gives the Lockean no 
tools for defending her picture of personal identity, and (c) the situation for 
the Lockean is far more troubling. 
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